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Narrative of the western theatre in the American Civil War, 1880s

13_Narrative Page 13

Johnston intended that his entire force would be there by 3 or 4 o'clock on the morning of the 5th.  {newspaper clipping}
The bad condition of the roads, misapprehension of orders, and the inevitable confusion arising from a first movement of a large army, conspired to retard the concentration of the army and formation of lines of battle until late in the afternoon of the 5th, when the mistake was made of postponing the attack until the next morning.  
During the march, which under more auspicious skies could have been easily accomplished in the time specified, the heavens opened and deluged the moving colums with torrents of rain.  Men and horses floundered in the mud, artillery stuck fast, and the tired troops bivouacked at night without shelter in the midst of a tempest that raged with unwonted fury.  Through the darkness and pelting rain they staggered forward over flooded roads and swollen streams, the tattoo in the Union encampments guiding them to their appointed postitions.  
JOHNSTON'S PLAN OF ATTACK.  
The following "memorandum for the commanders of corps and the reserve" indicates the confidence that General Johnston felt in the successful issue of the impending engagement: "In the approaching battle every effort should be made to turn the left flank of the enemy, so as to cut off his line of retreat to the Tennessee River and throw him back on Owl Creek, where he will be obliged to surrender."

In the afternoon of April 3rd Colonel R.P. Buckland comd 4th brigade of Shermans division composed of the 72, 70 & 48 Ohio made a reconiasance in the front and had a slite skirmish with the rebel cavalry.  On the next day (apr 4th) there was annother slite skirmish and 4 men and Maj Crocker of the 72 Ohio and Lieut Geer of the 48th Ohio were capt.  
All was quiet on the 5th until about 5 p.m. when heavy firing were heard on the picket line the long roll was beat and the

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Johnston intended that his entire force would be there by 3 or 4 o'clock on the morning of the 5th. {newspaper clipping} The bad condition of the roads, misapprehension of orders, and the inevitable confusion arising from a first movement of a large army, conspired to retard the concentration of the army and formation of lines of battle until late in the afternoon of the 5th, when the mistake was made of postponing the attack until the next morning. During the march, which under more auspicious skies could have been easily accomplished in the time specified, the heavens opened and deluged the moving colums with torrents of rain. Men and horses floundered in the mud, artillery stuck fast, and the tired troops bivouacked at night without shelter in the midst of a tempest that raged with unwonted fury. Through the darkness and pelting rain they staggered forward over flooded roads and swollen streams, the tattoo in the Union encampments guiding them to their appointed postitions. JOHNSTON'S PLAN OF ATTACK. The following "memorandum for the commanders of corps and the reserve" indicates the confidence that General Johnston felt in the successful issue of the impending engagement: "In the approaching battle every effort should be made to turn the left flank of the enemy, so as to cut off his line of retreat to the Tennessee River and throw him back on Owl Creek, where he will be obliged to surrender." In the afternoon of April 3rd Colonel R.P. Buckland comd 4th brigade of Shermans division composed of the 72, 70 & 48 Ohio made a reconiasance in the front and had a slite skirmish with the rebel cavalry. On the next day (apr 4th) there was annother slite skirmish and 4 men and Maj Crocker of the 72 Ohio and Lieut Geer of the 48th Ohio were capt. All was quiet on the 5th until about 5 p.m. when heavy firing were heard on the picket line the long roll was beat and the