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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1965-1967

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VIET MESSAGE

University of Iowa Vietnam Peace Committee

March - April 1967 Number 4 

A Proposal For Defeating A People's War

Despite the efforts of the U.S. officials in Washington and Saigon to picture the struggle in Vietnam as a result of an invasion " From the North", there are certain tell-tale signs that indicate the real nature of this war. That is to say, that what is going on in Vietnam reflects the classical patterns of a People's War. Such a tell-tale sign appeared in Des Moines Register of Jan. 13, 1967, in an article by Peter Arnett. Arnett interviewed a Mr. Early Young, a U.S. AID official. In this interview Mr. Young was quoted as saying the following: " The only way to pacify Vietnam is to put a U.S. Marine squad in every hamlet and keep it there." Mr. Young granted that this would amount to a virtual occupation of Southern Vietnam; but he cities the success of such projects that have already been undertaken around the U.S. Marine enclaves of Hue-Phu Bai, De Nang, and Chu Lai. Mr. Young is referring to Marine squads of 15 men each which he calls "guinea pig" squads. These squads act as "watch dogs" for a given hamlet. In the past when such duties were assumed by RVN troops ( Army of the Republic Of Vietnam), "pacified" hamlets would soon fall under NLF (National Liberation Front, or the Vietcong) domination. At any rate, the program is so "successful" that 70 additional " guinea pig" squads are planned for 1967. Mr. Young, who has been involved in pacification work for 10 years, did not speculate on the reasons for ARVN's failure to carry out it's duties , but we can say that the ARVN troops being Vietnamese had much to do with their " failure". The fact that Americans, Australians, and South Koreans (all non-Vietnamese) are doing the bulk of the fighting shows that the Vietnamese Nationalists have entered into another phase of their long struggle of the Vietnamese to achieve independence. The civil war phase between the NLF and Saigon is for all practical purposes at an end. This has now become an American - Vietnamese war. The Vietnamese hopes for independence lie with the success or failure of the NLF. As such, the NLF represents the vanguard of a mass resistance movement against Americans . The main reason why ARVN has failed is not because they are incompetent. They failed because they were Vietnamese opposing the interests of the their fellow countrymen. The reason why pacification has not been able to work for the Americans is that such programs seek merely to imitate successful programs long since initiate by the NLF. The U.S pacification program is but a poor imitation of similar NLF programs. They are similar, not identical. What distinguishes the NLF programs from the American program is that the NLF program blossoms from within the people; the American program is something imposed from without. The NLF program is a product of Vietnamese hopes and aspirations for independence; the American program is a crude device designed to " save" people from the communist scrouge. But what do you do when you come to realize that the people you want to "save" do not feel in need of being "saved?" One way of answering this question is to resort to Mr. Young's "guinea pig" stunt. To "save" the people of Vietnam from Vietnamese, the saviors simply occupy every hamlet in Vietnam. May God save us from Mr. Earl Young's brand of salvation. 

Investing In War
    The title " war profiteering" might have been used for this section, but this suggests more malice on the part of those responsible than is likely to exist. Hardly any one acts with knowing malice or callousness; those reaping the profit are no doubt imbued with thee arguments "proving" that our "cause" in Vietnam is "just". Here we would like to call attention only to the fact that the profit motive provides a strong incentive for many people to find rationalizations for our conduct in Vietnam. The extent of this kind of influence can be gauged from the investment advisory literature, from which we quote:
     Merrill Lunch bulletin, Sept, 28, 1966: " Defense sparks electronics ..... Ling-Temco-Vought president Cylde Skeen reports sales up 48%, profits up 150% .... P.R. Mallory & Co. profits up 20 to 40%."
   Van Strum & Towne, Inc., Dec. 1966: Business in 1967 is likely to be very strong in the military sector, rather weak in a number of (other) areas." 
   Merrill Lynch, Jan. 12, 1967: Recommends Scovill Mfg. Co " Fabricating, representing the primary contributor of Scovill's sales and earnings, is benefiting from continue strong demand, particularly from the requirements of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam."
     Goodbody & Co., Dec. 28, 1966: " We believe that sometime after the first of the year the Defense Department will announce plans to go ahead with at least a limited deployment of the NIke X anti-missile systems.... We regard Raytheon as the best speculation on this $3 billion to $5 billion project" 
    (How many lobbyists does Raytheon maintain to help push up defense spending? These are billions, not millions.) 
    The writer has many more examples on hand, including Textron, recommended specifically for its production of helicopters for Vietnam. The author has been personally telephoned twice by brokers recommending stock purchases on account of profit potential in Vietnam. In one case it was to buy Northwest Orient Air. stock, and the other, Kendall Co. stock. Kendall is expected to make a lot on bandages.

Saving...

VIET MESSAGE University of Iowa Vietnam Peace Committee March - April 1967 Number 4 A Proposal For Defeating A People's War Despite the efforts of the U.S. officials in Washington and Saigon to picture the struggle in Vietnam as a result of an invasion " From the North", there are certain tell-tale signs that indicate the real nature of this war. That is to say, that what is going on in Vietnam reflects the classical patterns of a People's War. Such a tell-tale sign appeared in Des Moines Register of Jan. 13, 1967, in an article by Peter Arnett. Arnett interviewed a Mr. Early Young, a U.S. AID official. In this interview Mr. Young was quoted as saying the following: " The only way to pacify Vietnam is to put a U.S. Marine squad in every hamlet and keep it there." Mr. Young granted that this would amount to a virtual occupation of Southern Vietnam; but he cities the success of such projects that have already been undertaken around the U.S. Marine enclaves of Hue-Phu Bai, De Nang, and Chu Lai. Mr. Young is referring to Marine squads of 15 men each which he calls "guinea pig" squads. These squads act as "watch dogs" for a given hamlet. In the past when such duties were assumed by RVN troops ( Army of the Republic Of Vietnam), "pacified" hamlets would soon fall under NLF (National Liberation Front, or the Vietcong) domination. At any rate, the program is so "successful" that 70 additional " guinea pig" squads are planned for 1967. Mr. Young, who has been involved in pacification work for 10 years, did not speculate on the reasons for ARVN's failure to carry out it's duties , but we can say that the ARVN troops being Vietnamese had much to do with their " failure". The fact that Americans, Australians, and South Koreans (all non-Vietnamese) are doing the bulk of the fighting shows that the Vietnamese Nationalists have entered into another phase of their long struggle of the Vietnamese to achieve independence. The civil war phase between the NLF and Saigon is for all practical purposes at an end. This has now become an American - Vietnamese war. The Vietnamese hopes for independence lie with the success or failure of the NLF. As such, the NLF represents the vanguard of a mass resistance movement against Americans . The main reason why ARVN has failed is not because they are incompetent. They failed because they were Vietnamese opposing the interests of the their fellow countrymen. The reason why pacification has not been able to work for the Americans is that such programs seek merely to imitate successful programs long since initiate by the NLF. The U.S pacification program is but a poor imitation of similar NLF programs. They are similar, not identical. What distinguishes the NLF programs from the American program is that the NLF program blossoms from within the people; the American program is something imposed from without. The NLF program is a product of Vietnamese hopes and aspirations for independence; the American program is a crude device designed to " save" people from the communist scrouge. But what do you do when you come to realize that the people you want to "save" do not feel in need of being "saved?" One way of answering this question is to resort to Mr. Young's "guinea pig" stunt. To "save" the people of Vietnam from Vietnamese, the saviors simply occupy every hamlet in Vietnam. May God save us from Mr. Earl Young's brand of salvation. Investing In War The title " war profiteering" might have been used for this section, but this suggests more malice on the part of those responsible than is likely to exist. Hardly any one acts with knowing malice or callousness; those reaping the profit are no doubt imbued with thee arguments "proving" that our "cause" in Vietnam is "just". Here we would like to call attention only to the fact that the profit motive provides a strong incentive for many people to find rationalizations for our conduct in Vietnam. The extent of this kind of influence can be gauged from the investment advisory literature, from which we quote: Merrill Lunch bulletin, Sept, 28, 1966: " Defense sparks electronics ..... Ling-Temco-Vought president Cylde Skeen reports sales up 48%, profits up 150% .... P.R. Mallory & Co. profits up 20 to 40%." Van Strum & Towne, Inc., Dec. 1966: Business in 1967 is likely to be very strong in the military sector, rather weak in a number of (other) areas." Merrill Lynch, Jan. 12, 1967: Recommends Scovill Mfg. Co " Fabricating, representing the primary contributor of Scovill's sales and earnings, is benefiting from continue strong demand, particularly from the requirements of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam." Goodbody & Co., Dec. 28, 1966: " We believe that sometime after the first of the year the Defense Department will announce plans to go ahead with at least a limited deployment of the NIke X anti-missile systems.... We regard Raytheon as the best speculation on this $3 billion to $5 billion project" (How many lobbyists does Raytheon maintain to help push up defense spending? These are billions, not millions.) The writer has many more examples on hand, including Textron, recommended specifically for its production of helicopters for Vietnam. The author has been personally telephoned twice by brokers recommending stock purchases on account of profit potential in Vietnam. In one case it was to buy Northwest Orient Air. stock, and the other, Kendall Co. stock. Kendall is expected to make a lot on bandages.