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Burlington Commission on Human Rights, 1964-1965

Iowa Law Review, "State Civil Rights Statute: Some Proposals" Page 1097

1964]     STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES     1097

it "should be strictly construed."112 Additionally, that court has also been convinced that "where specific words of the same nature are used in a statute followed by the use of general ones, these general terms take their meaning from the specific ones and are restricted to the same genus; in other words, comprehend only those things of the same kind as the specific ones."113 As a result, in construing this particular statutory provision, the courts might be inclined to unduly limit its application. Fortunately, this has not been the rule in the few cases dealing with this question thus far.
   The Iowa civil rights provision has been held to cover drug store soda fountains despite the fact that they are not expressly listed in the statute.114 This was the first and only holding by the Iowa Supreme Court that the statute could be applied to an enterprise not expressly listed therein. Such an extension is clearly property, as well as imperative, in light of the provision's admonition that it also covers "all other places where refreshments are served."
   The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa has similarly applied the act to an establishment not specifically listed. That court concluded that dance halls open to the public for a fee are covered by the provision's clause relating to "theatres, and all other places of amusement."115 Neither the rule of strict construction nor ejusdem generis militated against such a conclusion. Those rules "cannot be applied to defeat the evident purpose of the statute or restrict the scope of subjects the Legislature intended to include within the act."116 As a result, the court insisted that the provision made no distinction between places of "amusement" where the entertained
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112 Id. at 95, 123 N.W. at 233. The fact that the act was in derogation of the common law in Iowa seems attested by Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 Iowa 536, 25 N.W. 766 (1885), discussed the note 27 supra. But see the early English case of Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 484, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464-65 (1701), where the court insisted that at common law:
[Where-ever any subject takes upon himself a public trust for the benefit of the rest of his fellow-subjects, he is eo ipso bound to serve the subject in all the things that are within the reach and comprehension of such an office, under pain of an action against him. ... If on the road a shoe fall off my horse, and I come to a smith to have one put on, and the smith refuse to do it, an action will lie against him, because he has made profession of a trade which is for the public good, and has thereby exposed and vested an interest of himself in all the King's subjects that will employ him in the way of his trade. If an innkeeper refuse to entertain a guest where his house is not full, an action will lie against him, and so against a carrier, if his horses be not loaded, and he refuse to take a packet proper to be sent by a carrier. ...
113 Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa, 89, 98, 123 N.W. 231, 234 (1909).
114 State v. Katz, 241 Iowa 115, 40 N.W.2d 41 (1949).
115 Ames v. Prom, Inc. F. Supp, 615, 622-24 (N.D. Iowa 1954). This was an action for damages based on diversity jurisdiction.
116 Id. at 625.

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1964] STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES 1097 it "should be strictly construed."112 Additionally, that court has also been convinced that "where specific words of the same nature are used in a statute followed by the use of general ones, these general terms take their meaning from the specific ones and are restricted to the same genus; in other words, comprehend only those things of the same kind as the specific ones."113 As a result, in construing this particular statutory provision, the courts might be inclined to unduly limit its application. Fortunately, this has not been the rule in the few cases dealing with this question thus far. The Iowa civil rights provision has been held to cover drug store soda fountains despite the fact that they are not expressly listed in the statute.114 This was the first and only holding by the Iowa Supreme Court that the statute could be applied to an enterprise not expressly listed therein. Such an extension is clearly property, as well as imperative, in light of the provision's admonition that it also covers "all other places where refreshments are served." The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa has similarly applied the act to an establishment not specifically listed. That court concluded that dance halls open to the public for a fee are covered by the provision's clause relating to "theatres, and all other places of amusement."115 Neither the rule of strict construction nor ejusdem generis militated against such a conclusion. Those rules "cannot be applied to defeat the evident purpose of the statute or restrict the scope of subjects the Legislature intended to include within the act."116 As a result, the court insisted that the provision made no distinction between places of "amusement" where the entertained _________________________ 112 Id. at 95, 123 N.W. at 233. The fact that the act was in derogation of the common law in Iowa seems attested by Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 Iowa 536, 25 N.W. 766 (1885), discussed the note 27 supra. But see the early English case of Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 484, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464-65 (1701), where the court insisted that at common law: [Where-ever any subject takes upon himself a public trust for the benefit of the rest of his fellow-subjects, he is eo ipso bound to serve the subject in all the things that are within the reach and comprehension of such an office, under pain of an action against him. ... If on the road a shoe fall off my horse, and I come to a smith to have one put on, and the smith refuse to do it, an action will lie against him, because he has made profession of a trade which is for the public good, and has thereby exposed and vested an interest of himself in all the King's subjects that will employ him in the way of his trade. If an innkeeper refuse to entertain a guest where his house is not full, an action will lie against him, and so against a carrier, if his horses be not loaded, and he refuse to take a packet proper to be sent by a carrier. ... 113 Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa, 89, 98, 123 N.W. 231, 234 (1909). 114 State v. Katz, 241 Iowa 115, 40 N.W.2d 41 (1949). 115 Ames v. Prom, Inc. F. Supp, 615, 622-24 (N.D. Iowa 1954). This was an action for damages based on diversity jurisdiction. 116 Id. at 625.