DIY History | Transcribe | Campus Culture | Burlington Commission on Human Rights, 1964-1965 | Iowa Law Review, "State Civil Rights Statute: Some Proposals" Page 1125

Transcribe
Translate

Burlington Commission on Human Rights, 1964-1965

Iowa Law Review, "State Civil Rights Statute: Some Proposals" Page 1125

1964]     STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES     1125

those powers specifically granted them by the legislature. However, powers specifically delegated to our local governments are now to "be construed to confer upon such corporations broad and implied power over all local and internal affairs."
   Sections 366.1 and 368.2 specifically delegate to Iowa cities and towns "general powers [to provide] ... for the protection of their property and inhabitants, and the preservation of peace and good order" and "preserve the health, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, order, comfort, and convenience of such corporations and the inhabitants thereof." On its face, this can fairly be deemed a grant of general police powers by the state to our local governments.191 Since it has been previously noted that the legislation proposed here is within the competence of a state's police powers, it should be within the police powers conferred upon our cities.192 However, in the past, Iowa courts have construed the above grant of municipal police powers extremely narrowly, refusing to validate its exercise by cities or towns unless indispensable to their existence.193 This situation is now necessarily changed. Construed as the act of 1963 demands, the express grant of general police powers found in sections 366.1 and 368.2 now clearly authorizes local governments in Iowa to enact any constitutional legislation they deem necessary to deal with their "local and internal affairs"; that is, so long as local regulation of any particular subject has not been pre-empted or specifically barred by actions of the General Assembly.
   The amendment to section 368.2 can also be viewed as a specific grant of substantive powers to Iowa cities and towns over all "strictly local and internal affairs."194 Support for this notion can be gleaned from various sources including the sentence stating that, "The rule that cities and towns have only those powers expressly conferred by statute has no application to this code." If this view of the amendment
________________________

191 See Wilson v. City of Council Bluffs, 253 Iowa 162, 110 N.W.2d 569 (1961); Huff v. City of Des Moines, 244 Iowa 89, 56 N.W.2d 54 (1952); Cecil v. Toenjes, 210 Iowa 407, 228 N.W. 874 (1930). On the scope of state police powers, see text accompanying notes 77-85 supra.
192 Note, for example, that under its delegated power to make regulations "necessary for protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons," D.C. CODE ANN. 1-226 (1961), the city government of the District of Columbia recently enacted a fair housing ordinance. New York Times, Jan. 1, 1964, p. 1, col. 4. See also Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962) (ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race in restaurants is a valid exercise of the power granted the city to "regulate restaurants" and "promote the public health, safety, convenience, comfort ... and welfare.")
193 E.g., Dotson v. City of Ames, 251 Iowa 467, 101 N.W.2d 711 (1960); Downey v. City of Sioux City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929).
194 See discussion in note, 49 IOWA L. REV. 826 (1964).

Saving...

1964] STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES 1125 those powers specifically granted them by the legislature. However, powers specifically delegated to our local governments are now to "be construed to confer upon such corporations broad and implied power over all local and internal affairs." Sections 366.1 and 368.2 specifically delegate to Iowa cities and towns "general powers [to provide] ... for the protection of their property and inhabitants, and the preservation of peace and good order" and "preserve the health, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, order, comfort, and convenience of such corporations and the inhabitants thereof." On its face, this can fairly be deemed a grant of general police powers by the state to our local governments.191 Since it has been previously noted that the legislation proposed here is within the competence of a state's police powers, it should be within the police powers conferred upon our cities.192 However, in the past, Iowa courts have construed the above grant of municipal police powers extremely narrowly, refusing to validate its exercise by cities or towns unless indispensable to their existence.193 This situation is now necessarily changed. Construed as the act of 1963 demands, the express grant of general police powers found in sections 366.1 and 368.2 now clearly authorizes local governments in Iowa to enact any constitutional legislation they deem necessary to deal with their "local and internal affairs"; that is, so long as local regulation of any particular subject has not been pre-empted or specifically barred by actions of the General Assembly. The amendment to section 368.2 can also be viewed as a specific grant of substantive powers to Iowa cities and towns over all "strictly local and internal affairs."194 Support for this notion can be gleaned from various sources including the sentence stating that, "The rule that cities and towns have only those powers expressly conferred by statute has no application to this code." If this view of the amendment ________________________ 191 See Wilson v. City of Council Bluffs, 253 Iowa 162, 110 N.W.2d 569 (1961); Huff v. City of Des Moines, 244 Iowa 89, 56 N.W.2d 54 (1952); Cecil v. Toenjes, 210 Iowa 407, 228 N.W. 874 (1930). On the scope of state police powers, see text accompanying notes 77-85 supra. 192 Note, for example, that under its delegated power to make regulations "necessary for protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons," D.C. CODE ANN. 1-226 (1961), the city government of the District of Columbia recently enacted a fair housing ordinance. New York Times, Jan. 1, 1964, p. 1, col. 4. See also Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962) (ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race in restaurants is a valid exercise of the power granted the city to "regulate restaurants" and "promote the public health, safety, convenience, comfort ... and welfare.") 193 E.g., Dotson v. City of Ames, 251 Iowa 467, 101 N.W.2d 711 (1960); Downey v. City of Sioux City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929). 194 See discussion in note, 49 IOWA L. REV. 826 (1964).